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IN DEFENSE OF
UNION INVOLVEMENT IN
WORKER OWNERSHIP
Toni Delmonte
I. INTRODUCTION
The current corporate strategy of buying and selling
companies as a means of producing a profit has caused
serious problems in the economy. Diversification is partially
responsible for the evident neglect of individual firms and
specific industries. Productivity in these unattended firms
and industries continues to decline. Several American industries are no longer effectively competing with foreign imports. Lack of productivity and increased foreign
competition in combination with the recession of the 1980's
has resulted in increased unemployment, the flight of capital to areas where inexpensive labor is available, and the
lack of economic development in America.
Faced with these predicaments, organized labor encounters serious challenges. Unionists are wrestling with2
a variety of strategies with which to meet these difficulties:
retarding capital mobility and preventing shutdowns by acquiring control over pension funds, lobbying for plant closing prenotification, 3 and advocating the use of eminent
domain by communities.4 Some unions have lobbied for
protectionist measures. Several are beginning to organize
workers in other countries. And while some unions advocate converting plants in declining or unprofitable businesses to other product lines, a few unionists advocate
subsidizing or nationalizing unprofitable businesses. None
of these strategies have so far been more than occasionally successful.5
As experience demonstrates the weakness of traditional economic strategies, labor has become far more conscious of the need to find new strategies. Unions are aware
that collective bargaining is a troubled institution and understand that techniques traditionally used to bring collective bargaining to unwilling employers, including economic
pressure and government regulation, have lost much of their
6
potency.
Worker ownership is one strategy unions are exploring
as a way to gain some control over capital and anchor it
in communities. Worker ownership can be effective in assisting local communities to create, retain and improve
jobs.7 Thus, unionists should include worker ownership as
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a tactic in the general struggle for economic reform.8
However, labor's traditional skepticism of worker ownership has hindered employee ownership of business. Former President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
Samuel Gompers' early endorsement of collective bargaining as the basis for the labor movement over the co-existent
policy of cooperatively owned businesses has impeded active union involvement in this area.' The past struggle between ideologies within the labor movement should not be
repeated with the victor allowed to suppress employee
ownership as an effective tactic.
In order for worker owned companies to survive as
profitable businesses and worker ownership to be an effective tool in revitalizing the economy, the intimate assistance of labor organizations, the community, and
government is required. The worker owned company will
look to these entities for leadership, funding, and technical
assistance.
This paper examines the role unions can play in economic development through worker ownership. Following
a discussion of the internal ideological struggle within the
labor movement, the paper describes in detail the transformation of a single company, Rath Packing Company,
to an employee owned company. Although several unions
have undertaken many worker ownership projects," the lessons learned from the union's participation in Rath, including both the mistakes made and successes achieved, are
indicative of problems with past projects and can serve as
a guide for future attempts. Unions are assisting workers
to become owners and, at the same time, are creating new
roles for themselves. Although the actual methods utilized
to gain ownership of capital and secure control vary, three
principal vehicles exist:" employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs), 2 worker cooperatives,'13 and, what I term, creative collective bargaining. 4 Although some unions are taking the offense in hostile takeover bids by becoming players
in the highly technical and competitive world of corporate
takeovers and reorganizations," I will not address this issue.
An equally important part of my discussion will focus
on the necessity for substantial union involvement during
negotiations and a solid, continuous union presence once
employee ownership is established. It is imperative that worker representatives are present to ensure workers' rights and
benefits during and after negotiations. Moreover, I believe
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the opportunity to democratize corporate institutions is not
16
only ripe but the more significant goal.
The involvement of unions in employee ownership
raises numerous legal questions involving a myriad of corporate law, finance, and labor law issues. The paper will
address the following two complex legal questions. First
is the potential conflict of interest when union officials sit
on boards of companies which in turn raises several distinct issues, namely, the conflicting fiduciary responsibilities of corporate directors and union officials; the issue of
union involvement and employer domination and the issue of union representatives' duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act; union officers' access
to and disclosure of information; and, the potential antitrust
and competition problems that arise. Second is the question whether pension funds can be used to assist employee
ownership. Unions have had to learn to arrange financing;
they are often prevented from proceeding due to a shortage of capital. The use of pension funds to finance projects
can be useful in strengthening employee ownership as a
strategy for economic reform.
Although the law is inconclusive in these areas and
there are obstacles, the law should not discourage employee
ownership and control in a situation which makes financial sense to both the company and the employees.
Moreover, these obstacles should not prevent labor organizations from forging the way to economic redevelopment
and revitalization.
II. LABOR'S TRADITIONAL
VIEW OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
The American labor movement has been shaped by
the struggle between two diametric ideologies: the defense
of the union's position in the capitalist system and the desire
to change the system. The strong possibility for a reoccurrence of this ideological rift merits a reassessment of the
events leading to the original division.
During the late 1860's, William Sylvis, an avid believer
in trade unionism, pronounced his disillusionment with the
trade union movement He concluded that "there are a number of grievances ... that cannot be reached or removed
by trade unions ... No permanent reform can ever be established through the agency of trade unions... 71' His
major complaint against trade unionism was with the ineffectiveness of the strike, evidenced by the defeat of the
Iron Molders' International Union. 8
Sylvis espoused the philosophy of cooperation to correct basic flaws in the economy. 9 He believed cooperation
would eradicate class conflict by eliminating the wage system; he envisioned a better social order created by the laboring class. 20 His efforts materialized into the establishment
of several cooperative foundries during the post-Civil War
depression. In the early part of 1868, eight shops were operating successfully, four were ready to open, and twenty were
in various stages of organization. 2 Moreover, Sylvis persuaded the International Union to assume control of a
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cooperative foundry in Pittsburgh.
The entire labor and social reform effort was affected
by the cooperative movement and popular public interest
was awakened. The National Labor Union endorsed the
movement as "one of the most powerful agents for the elevation of labor and the equitable distribution of wealth: 22
However, this favorable impression was blackened by the
financial demise of the Pittsburgh foundry. Workers were
either reluctant or unable to purchase stock, and creditors
were unwilling to support the struggling foundry. Faced with
severe financial difficulties and unable to secure sufficient
capital, the local union turned to the International for support. Unfortunately, the International branded as illegal the
transfer of strike pay to the cooperative 3 The culmination
of these factors resulted in the closing of the Pittsburgh
foundry and the beginning of the end of Sylvis' inspired
cooperative movement.
By the 1880's, the various factions of the labor movement were polarized along ideological lines. The Knights
of Labor, descendant of the National Labor Union, adopted the policy and historical legacy of reform unionism and
maintained that only the basic transformation of the structure of society could solve the difficulties of the working
class. 24 Meanwhile, the renewed trade union movement contested social reconstruction. It looked instead toward immediate material improvements within the framework of
the existing institutions and relied essentially on economic
action.2"
While the Knights of Labor continued to perpetuate
the reform tradition of American labor, the leaders of the
trade unions began institutionalizing the collective bargaining process. Around the turn of the 20th century, trade unions, through the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
prevailed over the Knights of Labor.26 Essentially, the
productive power of the capitalist system was accepted by
organized labor, and labor leaders sought to guarantee the
rights of workers within the existing system rather than seek
to change it. This strategy entailed a substantial narrowing of the aims of the labor movement. The division between labor and management was accepted; management
defined unions as representatives of a particular interest
within the firm. Self-management and worker ownership
consequently disappeared from labor's agenda. President
of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, drew the line conclusively
while endorsing the doctrine of "pure and simple unionism':
Collective bargaining in industry does not imply that wage earners shall assume control of
industry, or responsibility for financial management. It proposes that employees shall have the
right to organize and to deal with the employer
through selected representatives as to wages
and working conditions... [T]here is no belief
held in the trade unions that its members shall
control the plant or usurp the rights of the own27
ers.
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Although there have been important subsequent developments in the labor movement since 1920, the strategy constructed by the AFL has not been significantly
modified. The "pure and simple unionism" doctrine underlies the current body of labor law, labor relations theory,
and the interaction between employers, unions, and employees.
Under the National Labor Relations Act,28 employers
and unions have a duty2 9 to "bargain collectively ...subject
to the provisions of section 9(a)" Section 9(a) declares that
the union shall be the exclusive spokesperson "in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of work 30° Consequently, a remarkable amount of
time has been devoted to interpreting section 9(a), in effect defining mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. Most important to the distinction between mandatory
and permissive subjects of bargaining is the conception of
managerial prerogatives. As a result, workers' rights and
the quality of working conditions and the unions' protection have been severely restricted. Workers' interests are
demarcated from managerial interests and further distinguished from the abstract interests of the enterprise. This
conviction is precisely captured by Justice3 1Blackmun in First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB:
Management must be free from the constraints
of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business. It
also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling
its conduct an unfair labor practice. Congress
did not explicitly state what issues of mutual
concern to union and management it intended
to exclude from mandatory bargaining.
Nonetheless, in view of an employer's need for
unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial
impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit,
for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business ...
Thus, self-management and worker ownership have been
legally removed from labor's agenda as well.
III. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE
COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT
Since the early 1970's, issues of worker ownership and
control have resurfaced. Organized labor has reacted with
ambivalence, if not resistance, to the growth in worker
ownership of businesses. According to a 1977 report,32 a
substantial number of union officials expressed skepticism
about employee ownership and its implications for labor.
A frequent source of skepticism was the impact of employee
14,

ownership on collective bargaining. It was viewed as having a potentially negative impact by eliminating the necessary conflict of interest and aligning worker interests with
managerial ones. One unionist anticipated that "under such
econocircumstances, labor's traditional function(s) in this
" 33
my are changed dramatically if not eliminated
Today while there is lingering skepticism, nine percent
of the private sector workforce (nine million workers) now
participate in employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs),
with additional workers involved in other forms of ownership or management participation. 34 Currently, substantial
tax benefits exist for ESOPs. 31 Some states have passed
laws adopting the legal structure of the successful industrial cooperatives of Mondragon, Spain, facilitating the establishment of worker cooperatives. 36 Many state
governments now also have programs to support worker
37
ownership.
Some unions have taken the initiative and are leading
the way in the development of worker ownership as a strategy. 3 8 Organized labor can ill afford to ignore the increase
in number and complexity of worker ownership transactions, especially when coupled with decreasing union membership. With caution and a critical perspective, unions can
use worker ownership positively as one ingredient in a mix
3
of capital strategies.

9

IV. THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF
THE RATH PACKING COMPANY
A critical perspective is necessary in order for worker
ownership to have a positive influence on workers, the labor
movement and overall economic reform. The demise of
Rath Packing Company ("Rath") is one example from which
to learn. Rath was mismanaged to the brink of collapse
and the city of Waterloo, Iowa was in danger of losing one
of its major employers. The union local, facing the potential loss of its primary workplace, attempted to gain some
degree of control over its future. As a result, Rath Packing
Company was one of the first industrial plants to be worker owned and controlled.4"
In the 1940's Rath was considered one of the most
modem meatpackers in the industry. 4' During the 1950's
and 1960's, management failed to make several strategic
moves: they missed the opportunity to market pork
products in the supermarkets, believing "mom & pop" stores
would continue to dominate the market, and they decided
42
not to reinvest in modem machinery and new processes.
In addition, in the 1970's, the Nixon administration's price
controls were applied to Rath's products, but not to livestock
prices. 43 Labor-management disputes were also common
throughout this period.44 During the late 1970's, public loans
and guarantees helped Rath remain viable. At the same
time, United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union ("UFCW) Local 46 was, in effect, granting the company loans by agreeing to defer company pension fund payments. 45 In 1978, management asked Local 46, which
represented most employees, to take a 50 percent wage
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cut, to give up one week of vacation and to delay a costof-living pay increase. The union rejected this proposal.
Rath was the second largest employer in Black Hawk
County, Iowa, and the prospect of plant closure was an
ominous prospect to the people in the county. In response,
the community initiated action to channel short term funds
to Rath, and to study the intermediate and longer term
needs and potential for the firm. The Black Hawk County
Economic Development Committee assembled a Rath
Study Committee made up of representatives from the union, Rath, and local and regional public and private organizations.47 The committee received a U.S. Department of
Commerce Economic Development Administration grant
to commission a consultant's study of options for saving
the company. The study recommended several major
changes: the infusion of capital, the reorganization of the
sales force, and the tightening up of labor practices and
operational procedures.48 However, the competitive life expectancy of the Waterloo plant was estimated to be only
three to five years, after which it would again be an un49
profitable enterprise.
The next year, 1979, Rath Packing was saved from
bankruptcy when Lyle Taylor, president of Meat Cutter Local 46, proposed, independently from International headquarters, that union employees purchase a controlling
interest in the company. The employees took wage cuts
and deferred benefits in return for 60 percent of the company's treasury stock."0 These actions provided the necessary new equity to leverage a HUD-UDAG loan;
consequently, Black Hawk County and the City of Waterloo were able to lend Rath $4,500,000 for capital investment from this federal grant. Rath also received $3 million
from the Economic Development Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce.' This infusion of capital
prevented outside investors, interested in making substantial cuts in employee wages and fringe benefits, from gaining control of the firm.
Rath also agreed to a profit sharing plan, through which
50 percent of future pre-tax profits were to be used to restore funding to the pension plan and pay employees
deferred wages and benefits.5 2 Furthermore, the acceptance
of the above agreement was conditioned upon elections for
a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and new directors to
replace existing directors on the Board of Directors.5 3 The
union chose ten new Board directors, three of whom were
rank and file activists and seven of whom were chosen for
their professional, business and political affiliations.5 4 The
Local Agreement throughout maintained the basic features
of the nationally negotiated labor-management Master
5
Agreement.To effectuate the transfer of 60 percent of the stock
negotiated in exchange for the wage and benefit cuts, Rath
5 6
attempted to develop a non-ESOP perpetual stock trust.
The approval of the Department of Labor (DOL) is required
before such a trust may be established. DOL, however,
would not give a "prohibited transaction exemption 57 be-
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cause the employees were buying more than 10 percent of
the stock and holding it in trust.5 8 In June 1980, single employees elected to make individual stock purchases while
awaiting the establishment of a trust.5 9 Unable to secure
DOEs approval, Rath pursued the establishment of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).60 On January 1,
1981, the DOL accepted Rath's ESOP. Local 46, representing workers' interests, assisted in the drafting of the plan.
Local 46 then presented the plan to the employees as a
means of saving jobs, limiting concessions, gaining control of the company and management decisionmaking, protecting the pension plan, and preventing a proposed
buy-out. 6 Employees independently elected to put their
stock into the Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT).62
Since some employees who had purchased stock individually chose not to contribute that stock to the ESOT, the
ESOT had only 49.5 percent of the total stock of the company rather than the anticipated 60 percent.63 The ESOT
held 1.8 million shares of employee-owned stock; Rath's
other 1.2 million shares remained publicly owned.
Rath established a 'two-tiered" or "instructed trusted'
model. Under this system, the ESOP Board of Trustees exercised the voting rights of all shares held in the ESOP
rather than passing the votes through the trust directly to
the employees. The employees 64 voted democratically on
all shareholder issues (the "first tier) and then required the
trustees to vote (the "second tier") in accordance with the
results of the employee voting. 65 The ESOT Board of
Trustees was elected democratically by all participants on
a one vote per person basis, not a one vote per share basis. 66 The members of the Board of Trustees were required
to be plan participants, but could not be 'officer[s], employee[s], agent[s] or representative[s] of the union [UFCW
Local 46], or any other labor organization"'67 However, the
Union retained veto power over any possible changes in
power, and any plan modifications or termination
of its
68
agreement that created the plan with Rath.
Since ESOPs are designed solely for providing ownership,69 additional mechanisms for participation and control need to be independently instituted. Local 46 fought
for and established a system of worker participation from
the shop floor to the boardroom, in exchange for concessions.70 A top level steering committee was also created,
jointly chaired by union and management officials to meet
monthly, to plan activities, and monitor developments with
a strategic planning group to oversee the future of the company. On a volunteer basis employees joined Action
Research Teams (ARTs) where discussion and problem
solving was open to all topics related to the management
of Rath.
In 1981 a new CEO was elected. Herbert Einstein
declared an open house policy and promoted communication between management and workers. Lyle Taylor, the
President of Local 46, also accepted a position on the Board
of Directors in order to more accurately transmit union information and ideas to the Board. 7'
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With a workforce of 2200 employees and an annual
payroll of $35,000,000,12 Rath was able to save $5 million
in labor costs by 1983. This 20 percent reduction in labor3
costs per unit of production increased productivity.1
However, labor costs were only 15 percent of total costs.
Rath Packing Company was subsequently unable to successfully counteract unfavorable externally imposed conditions: high interest rates, high inventory costs, high hog
prices, declines in pork consumption, declines in prices,
non-union competition, and outdated plant and marketing
4
strategies.
Facing these unfavorable conditions, labormanagement relations at Rath began to deteriorate. The
last contract was negotiated in October, 1982. The pension plan was discontinued, with the approval of the union
by a vote of 60 percent, due to these bad economic circumstances.7" No other retirement plan replaced it. Rath
had been repeatedly requesting wage deferrals over the
years.7 6 The final request for an additional deferral of $2.50
an hour per person in February, 1983 caused the UFCW
International to file an unfair labor practice charge against
Rath. The International charged that Rath did not have the
authority to negotiate such a deferral under the existing contract. Local 46, however, agreed to the deferral on the basis that Herb Einstein would resign as CEO and union
president Lyle Taylor would take his place.7 7
In the spring of 1983, when Lyle Taylor became the
company president and CEO,' improved relations were anticipated. However, they worsened. In that year Rath was
forced to file chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. In an effort to make Rath more attractive to an outside buyer,
management asked and was granted relief from its union
contract by the presiding bankruptcy judge.7 9 In 1984,
management tried to decertify the union. However, they
were barred from doing so because of the above mentioned
pending unfair labor practice charge.80 The worker-owners
then began picketing to get a contract. When a union
steward was fired, 700 workers walked out of Rath for thirty
days and struck against the plant they owned."s The
steward was reinstated and grievance proceedings were
enacted.
These efforts and the reduction of the workforce, from
approximately 2,000 employees right after the buy-out to
approximately 300-400 employees, were unsuccessful. In
early 1985, Rath ceased operation and sold its assets later
82
that year.
V. THE NECESSARY ROLE UNIONS PLAY
Unions are better positioned than any other institution
in America to ensure the effectiveness of worker ownership. They have the financial resources, the organizational
knowledge, and the ideological commitment to workers' interests and collective action to play a major role in deter83
mining the character of worker ownership in this country.
As evidenced by the role played by the UFCW Local in
Rath, a union can render numerous services of great sig-
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nificance. Employee ownership can revitalize the labor
movement by providing both a means of influencing the
movement of capital and a framework for increased worker participation and control. Employee ownership can also
serve as a foundation for new organizing drives through
its ability to provide new jobs and financially significant
ownership in start-up companies. The question then becomes: how do unions effectively assist in worker ownership and why are they needed once a company becomes
worker owned?
Undoubtedly, unions will be required to develop new
capacities and skills in order to effectively lead the takeover
of industries.8 4 Since unions are not able to own companies themselves because of legal complications stemming
from conflicts of interest, they will need to develop their
own internal technical resources to provide support for their
locals and members. Union locals and their members will
need advice on how to conduct analyses of a company's
financial worth, market trends, prospective business decisions, and so on. Unions involved in employee ownership
can coordinate the efforts of experts, management, the
community and their members. Organized labor will have
to become proficient in developing effective leadership and
management skills and in facilitating workplace democra85

cy.

A precondition for the effective use of worker ownership is a detailed and full understanding of the company,
its markets and its industry.8 6 It is imperative to establish
that a company is viable prior to any efforts being made
to acquire ownership and control of that company. Employee ownership and control will not counter deficiencies
in the market.8 7 In the foregoing example, although a feasibility study was conducted at Rath, the union and the employees made the fatal mistake of ignoring the consultant's
study. Rath's competitive life expectancy, even after the injection of substantial federal grants, was estimated to be
only three to five years, after which time it would again be
unprofitable. Although Rath continued to operate until
1985, worker ownership, perhaps, was not the appropriate option to pursue.88 To avoid the misguided pursuit of
worker ownership, the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department has recommended that, foremost, feasibility studies
on the financial condition of the firm and its industry be
conducted so workers will understand all potential options."9
Furthermore, due to continuous financial strain, Rath
was forced to reduce pension benefits and eventually discontinue the pension plan altogether as a means of increasing capital. Although the ESOP at Rath was never intended
to replace the pension plan, the ESOP, in general, has been
manipulated to achieve many objectives other than its original purpose of exclusively benefitting employees.90
Although a minimal number of ESOPs have replaced pension plans,9 1 the potential risk to employee investments is
severe.92 As a result, the AFL-CIO is beginning to educate
workers as to the distinction between ESOPs and tradi-
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tional pensions plans while advocating the protection of
3
the latter.
ESOPs can redefine the roles of managers, stockholders, workers and the union if the ESOP specifically establishes employee control. Most ESOPs, however, do not
establish a mechanism for shaping company policy on
wages or other equally important decisions which affect
working conditions. In companies which have publicly traded stock, ESOPs grant employees the same limited voting
rights as other shareholders, such as the right to vote on
the sale of the firm or significant changes in company operations. In companies without publicly traded stock, the law
does not require most voting rights to be passed through
to employees. In general, voting must be passed through
only on major corporate issues (e.g., mergers, dissolution,
sale of all assets).94 Studies show that in 85 percent of all
companies with ESOPs, worker-owners do not have full
voting rights. 95 Often employees are not even granted the
right to vote for the Board of Directors. One ESOP
promoter told owners: "Through the ESOP, you can sell
the company and still keep it"96 Essentially, it all depends
on managements willingness to actively involve its new
worker-owners in decisionmaking.97 A handful of companies have organized ESOPs such that employees elect directors, or have a voice regarding issues such as wages, hours,
or working conditions.
It is essential that employee interests are ensured and
protected during negotiations establishing an ESOP; organized labor can fill this role. The time to establish control mechanisms such as immediate allocation of voting
stock, information exchange channels, and the right to elect
board members is before the ESOP instrument is finalized
and implemented. 00 To that end, worker representatives
should be sensitive to locating worker-sympathetic financial sources and legal advisors.
Although the law allows an ESOP to prevent employee
voting on issues that require shareholder voting, the law
will also allow the ESOP to stipulate to a wider array of
issues that employees can vote on. Substantial employee
voting rights can be provided for within the constraints of
ESOP law.98 A democratic ESOP9 9 can be instituted:
UFCW was instrumental in establishing a democratic
ESOP at Rath.
One must keep in mind, however, that democratic
ESOPs still only accord employees the right to vote on
shareholder issues, which are granted and often quite limited by state corporate statutory law. Once a union has ensured the establishment of a democratic ESOP, they should
also take the initiative in choosing new company management and educating management and workers about the
concepts of democratic ownership. '1 Education of the
workforce has become paramount in the agenda of many
of the existing private organizations providing technical assistance to worker-owned companies. 0 2
As noted earlier, control is as important as ownership;
this applies to ESOPs, worker cooperatives and situations
SPRNG 1990

where the collective bargaining agreement provides employee ownership rights. It is this author's position that a
worker-managed firm should place ultimate discretion over
all matters lying within its field of choice in the hands of
the firm's personnel, with each member of the workforce
having an equal vote regardless of what skills or managerial rank he or she may have.'0 3 Where plans are primarily
designed to improve productivity without offering effective
control, the union is an essential advocate for the workers
in a continuing struggle for control.'0 4 Even the more
democratic ESOPs and worker cooperatives require the perspective of the union.'05 As in Rath, the union can be effective in instituting a system of worker participation from
the shop floor6 to the board in order to obtain and maintain control'

0

Moreover, the union can monitor the daily operation
of the company. Unions can help ensure that the firm is
managed in the best interests of the workers. They can act
as a "forum through which to balance the interests of workers" and the "interests of the company" which' are not always coterminous, even where the employees have
workplace control' 0 7 Unions can represent workers' interests in decisions regarding the purchase of new equipment, retirement benefits, and plant expansions. As a leader
of the USWA said: "A union in an employee owned firm
must consider not just wages but also reinvestment:'0 8 Unions have already made advances towards filling this role.
For instance, unions have been granted the right to internal company reports and sales information,'0 9 which can
be used to keep employees informed about the company's
financial condition.
Most importantly, the union is needed to act as a
"legitimate opposition" between the individual and the
majority position. This "legitimate opposition concept
is rooted in the political community's first amendment
protection of dissenters' rights to free speech." 0 The union maintains its traditional role of protecting minority interests within the workplace community. The pro-employee
representation is needed to act as a forum for member
grievances. Surveys in unionized companies with ESOPs
indicate that most workers believe they need unions even
when they are "the owners"."' Stewards still have grievances
to handle. The UFCW played and maintained an active role
in representing unsatisfied worker-owners and protecting
their individual rights at Rath." 2 The union supported the
strike and represented the fired union steward during
grievance procedures. Even in the well-known Mondragon
network of cooperatives in Spain, where only one strike
has occurred in over twenty years, the importance of the
union in protecting individual rights is often overlooked.
Although the strike led to changes in operations and was
considered a beneficial learning experience, each of the
strike leaders was summarily fired and not reinstated." 3 Furthermore, collective bargaining agreements or formalized
forums of some form are still needed to ensure fair arrangements for promotions, layoffs, discipline and safe and
IC
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healthy working conditions." 4 In the Denver Cab Company, a worker cooperative, the organizational structure intentionally includes a negotiating committee composed of
several board members and coop managers to represent
members in bargaining with its six unions.! 5 Without formal and legitimate representation for employees interests,
these interests are not considered in the daily operations
6
of the business."

The union is necessary in the development of a worker owned company and essential during its operations. 1 7
The democratic organization requires an institutionalized
opposition that is recognized as legitimate. It is imperative
that the union be accepted as legitimate from the inception of the worker-owned company, as one of the first
abuses of power is to raise the costs of opposition." 8 In
order for the union to assume this position, an outline of
the union's oppositional role, the structure of the grievance
procedure, and the funding of the union's local operations
should be incorporated in the constitution of the new
democratic firm.'

9

VI. LEGAL ISSUES
As unions become more involved in worker ownership
they are stepping beyond traditional labor-management relations and labor law. This paper will discuss two main issues, union representation on corporate boards of directors
and the persuasive impact of pension funds, that give rise
to several legal questions of which unions should be aware
A. UNION REPRESENTATION ON
CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
Union representation on corporate boards is consonant
with the policies underlying American labor law as it has
been interpreted and developed over the past forty years.
Union board representation of employees is not a substitute for the collective bargaining process. 20 Rather, it complements and extends an institutional process that has
changed significantly since its origin. 2 ' Although employers and the courts still strongly resist union intervention in
managerial prerogatives,' 22 the scope of bargaining has
nonetheless expanded to encompass matters formally considered managerial prerogatives and, as evidenced by the
growing use of joint labor-management committees, cooperation has increasingly replaced confrontation.
Union board representation is a logical expansion of
employee influence on the 'running of the business' Board
representation would provide the union with direct input
into decisions presently beyond the scope of collective bargaining. Moreover, because the issues addressed on the
directorate level are often not discussed during the bargaining process, the position on the board could be the only
way for the workers' viewpoint to ever be considered in a
timely manner. Thus utilized, union representation would
effectively complement the collective bargaining process.
Union representation could reduce the inefficiency
resulting from organizational complexity, board-of-director
ineffectiveness, and capital market distortions. Union20

provided information could supplement information provided by management. The union-provided information could
illustrate the flaws in managements reasoning, thus assisting the shareholders and directors in making informed decisions. Union directors could also help to check
management inefficiency; they could devote considerably
more time to board matters than independent outside directors, and they would not have the same sympathy for
23
management as members of the "closed club of elites."'
Finally, because of their independence, union directors could
threaten to communicate managerial failings to management's two constituencies-the workers and the shareholders. Once again, the need for legitimate opposition is
demonstrated.
Agreement between the union and the corporation to
incorporate union-based board representation would provide a valid and economically beneficial exchange between
the parties.!2 4 Unless the parties explicitly indicate to the
contrary, the union presumably receives from the exchange
a board position to represent worker interests.' 2- The parties engage in arm's length bargaining, seeking out the best
possible bargain they can attain given the legal constraints
on their behavior. Therefore, when a corporation accedes
to a union's demand for a position on the board of directors, it evidently is the best bargain the corporation's
26
representatives could reach.
However, there are a series of legal impediments to union representation on corporate boards under current corporate and labor law. Questions have arisen concerning the
fiduciary duties of those who serve as both directors and
union representatives, employer domination and union interference and the union representative's duty of fair
representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and
the duty of information disclosure and antitrust and competition problems. Corporate and labor law is, however,
changing to enable unions to represent employee interests
on boards. The legal impediments outlined below should
be eroded and the alternatives that have been suggested
to facilitate representation without legal ramifications should
be strengthened to allow employee ownership to expand
and employees' interests to be considered in the daily operation of businesses.
a. The Fiduciary Responsibilities of
Corporate Directors and Union Officials
Union representatives on corporate boards face a conflict of interest problem under current corporate and labor
law."27
' A corporate director has a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders; a union official has a fiduciary duty
to the union and its members. A union official on a corporate board thus has a duty to both union members and
to shareholders. Whenever these two groups' interests conflict, the union officer is faced with a possible breach of
one of these duties.
The directors of a corporation are fiduciaries to the corporation's shareholders. The directors have a duty to serve
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the corporation's best interests and not to profit personally at the expense of the corporation! 28 Traditionally, a board
of directors could act only to make profits for stockholders. 29 Thus, a union board representative would not
be able to vote to further employee interests when they conflicted with shareholder interest without breaching the director's fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
Yet, courts have gone beyond the traditional approach
to directors' fiduciary duties. 30 The original contention for
vesting corporate control in the shareholders was that
shareholders, by providing the capital for the enterprise,
bore the risk of failure. This contention falters when one
considers that workers not only bear a substantial portion
of the risk of failure. but are also less able to protect themselves from assuming this risk.
A radical shift from current law is not necessary;
boards of directors are already making decisions benefitting employees. For example, directors have been allowed
to exercise uin good faith, the infinite details of business,
including wages which shall be paid to employees, the number of hours they shall work, the conditions under which
labor shall be carried on, and the prices for which products
shall be offered to the public.' 3 ' The courts are beginning
to grant boards wider discretion in considering the needs
of employees when developing corporate policy and are upholding the early stated principle that corporations have
an implied power to perform acts wholly or in part to protect or aid employees. 32 Corporations act as members of
society with certain social obligations and have a responconsumers, and
sibility to address the needs of employees,
1 33
the community in which they operate.
Furthermore the courts can rely on the express vote
of the shareholders or their representatives, the board, to
indicate that effective union representation is in the shareholders' long-term interests. Approving the offer of the
board seat is a further indication of compliance with shareholder interests. 3 The legal structure has already provided for worker input into corporate affairs: collective
bargaining focuses on wages, hours and conditions of employment.
However, voting to further shareholder interests when
they conflict with worker interests could also violate another
duty to which union officers are held by law. Section 501
of the Landrum-Griffin Act imposes a fiduciary responsibility on union officials "to refrain from dealing with [the
union] as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party
in any matter connected with his duties . . . " As the
Act fails to define the precise scope of an official's fiduciary
obligations, the courts have turned to common law precedent and the specific language of section 501. Basically,
the special problems and functions of a labor organization
have been taken into account in evaluating the actions of
union officials. To date, courts have36rarely intervened to
condemn a union official's conduct.
There are strong arguments that, in most circumstances, a union official on a corporate board would not
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violate section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act.1 37 Provid-

ed the employee representative does not act to undermine
union democracy or engage in personal profiteering, an employee representative may take actions without fear of
violating any fiduciary obligations to members of the union. As long as union democracy is maintained, employees
have an effective vehicle for replacing the representatives
and protecting their interests.
It could therefore be argued that the union board
representative's principal fiduciary responsibility should be
to the employees in the bargaining unit represented by the
union.13 1 When employee interests are implicated, the un-

ion director's sole fiduciary duty should be to further those
interests; however, when specific employee interests are not
directly involved, the union director should have the usual
corporate directors fiduciary duty to advance the corporationds interests, as defined by law.
An employee's welfare is closely, even ifindirectly, linked
to the corporation's financial health. Employees should be
able to bring derivative suits on either of two causes of action: that the union director failed to attempt to advance
employee interests or, if specific employee interests were
not involved, that the director breached his fiduciary duty
to further the corporation's welfare. To protect themselves,
the shareholders should also have a right of action against
union representatives on the board when an act in question is not part of a good faith effort to advance employee
interests.
Corporations certainly have an impact beyond shareholders alone yet shareholders are the sole group (other
than management) with any evident representation on the
board of directors. In seeking reform, requests by interested parties for outside directors and elections of public interest directors have been made and granted. Inadvertently,
however, the workers, who have one of the strongest and
clearest claims to representation, have been overlooked.
Employees' interests should be represented to boards of
directors as a serious consideration in the functioning of
the company.
b. Employer Domination/Union Interference
Perhaps the most obvious potential legal barrier to union involvement in board representation lies in the National Labor Relations Act. 40 Cooperation between
management and the union could be considered interference or domination of the collective bargaining arrangement
and either party could be accused of an unfair labor practice. 41 Under the Act, employee suggestions committees,
faculty governance boards, and junior boards of directors
have been termed labor organizations' and violations have
been found.142 Activities as superficially innocuous as

providing office space or supplies have constituted unfair
labor practices.'43 The creation of a codetermined board
of directors in a worker owned company is at the least a
potential violation of the Act.
However, there is a growing consensus that union direc2

tors will not likely be found in violation of section 8(a)(2)
of the National Labor Relations Acts.144 It is also doubtful
that these conflicts will arise in employee owned firms where
directors elected by the members sit on the company's
board! 45 As long as a majority of the board is not appointed
by the union, the NLRB is unlikely to find a proximate
danger of infection of the bargaining process unless there
is hard evidence of some actual abuse; mere potential for
abuse is not sufficient.1 46 Board discussion of collective bargaining strategy is one area in which board representation
of worker interests is questionable. Participation in this area
conflicts with the adversarial model of collective bargaining and would provide the union with an unfair advantage
in that process. One avoidance strategy might be for union directors to excuse themselves from such discussions 47
c. Duty of Fair Representation
Union representatives have a duty to treat their members in a "manner that is not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or in bad faith:"48 Unions may unexpectedly

violate their duty of fair representation while making decisions associated with the establishment and implementation of worker ownership. Two cases illustrate this potential
problem.

49

In Bodecker v. Local Union, No. P-46,' 50 the

plaintiff claimed that the union coerced employees into accepting an ESOP by telling them it was necessary for the
company's continued survival. The court held that, even if
the union's statements were not true, they were not made
arbitrarily or in bad faith. In Baker v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.,51 the plaintiff argued that the union had failed to pursue pension claims against the company following the employer's buy-out by an ESOR The Court found no bad faith
or egregious conduct, and ruled that the union had attempted to act in the best interest of the entire unit.
The union's official duty of fair representation, which
prohibits arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of employees
or groups of employees, is unlikely to be violated if the union takes precautions to ensure that all changes in negotiated benefits are collectively bargained for by the union and
ratified by union members 5 2 Following the procedures
specified in the union constitution and bylaws and explicitly
established contracts, the goal should be to ensure that the
interests of all members within the locals and locals within
the international are taken into account and treated impartially in making decisions and providing assistance in em53
ployee ownership situations.
d. Access to and Disclosure of Information
Corporate directors commonly enjoy a broad right of
inspection of corporate books and records. A union
representative should have the same right of access to information. Expansive disclosure is necessary; knowledge
of the financial condition of the corporation is crucial to
achieve organizational and worker goals. Yet the duty to
provide information under the NLRA to members or their
54
representatives has been limited
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Another potential problem, which presents a slightly
more complex situation, involves the confidentiality of information. If union representatives are allowed to release
information obtained through their position on the board
when such a release represents a good-faith effort to advance specific employee interests, this would conflict with
the director's duty not to disclose information. Yet, disclosure is necessary in order to make the union director's
representation of employees' interests effective. Prohibiting
disclosure of information would require the union representative to mislead other union officials intentionally whenever
confidential information led them to support union positions or actions different from those that appeared best to
other union officials and would inevitably conflict with the
obligation to explain to employee constituents the reasons
underlying various actions. Withholding such information
would seem to contravene, explicitly, the command of section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act.- 5
Because of the need for exchange of information in
order to meaningfully include employees' interests in the
operation of business, union representatives should have
the same right of access to information as is common
among other directors. Although the duty to provide information under the NLRA has been limited,'5 6 a strong argument can be made for the necessity of the exchange of
information in order to effectuate the union director's
representation of employees interests and to prevent a violation of section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act. As further support for this position, it is well recognized that
employee shareholders are privy to information that shareholders at-large may not necessarily be entitled to receive.57
e. Antitrust and Competition Problems
Union representatives on the boards of competing
firms might possibly have reasons for and opportunities to
engage in pricefixing, in violation of the Sherman 58 and
Clayton' 9 Antitrust Acts. Essentially, no person can be a
director in any two or more corporations at the same time
under certain conditions. 60 However, the Clayton Act does
not prohibit many kinds of "indirect interlocks" between corporations as long as one individual is not a director of two
competing corporations.' 6 While it is possible that labor
unions are exempt from the prohibition against interlock62
ing directorates, the issue has not been brought to court
A union that appointed members to the boards of competing companies as a result of the collective bargaining
process would be in a considerably weaker position than
one in which union members at individual companies are
elected by the worker-stockholders. 63 A union representative elected by local members would be much more likely
to have board status as an individual serving as an interested stockholder representing other interested stockholders
than would a union board member appointed by an international. In that case, the representative of the international
might be regarded chiefly as a legal "person7 with a potential interest in collusion. 6 4 Union members who serve on
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corporate boards of competing firms should not be individuals who have an opportunity and reason to meet on a regular basis within the union.6 5
On the other hand, the NLRB does present problems
when the analysis is of competition. In Bausch & Lomb,
166
the NLRB held that an employer does not violate the Act
by refusing to bargain with the certified union when the union has established a business enterprise in the same locality and industry as that of the employer and has thus
become one of its direct competitors.1 67 Naturally, the ability of an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith in this
situation poses a problem when an international union is
involved in converting several companies within an industry into worker owned companies. However, the principles
of Bausch & Lomb do not apply to situations in which the
employees own stock in their employer 69 since individual
union members who own stock in their own employer are
not in direct competition. Thus, unions that own a competing business are in a more vulnerable position. However,
1
Bausch & Lomb has not been strictly followed '
In sum, the interests of workers should be seriously
considered in the development of corporate policy, even in
the worker owned company. To that end, union spokespersons, representing the interests of not only their members
but of the entire workforce, should not be precluded from
boards of directors.
B. THE PERSUASIVE IMPACT OF PENSION
FUNDS
Aside from the legal issues that surround the potential conflicts of interest when union officials sit on corporate
boards of corporations, the legal issues that encompass
the use of pension funds to assist employee ownership must
also be explored. The innovative use of pension funds can
be an important tool in facilitating and implementing employee ownership. Pension funds have acquired an important place in the national economy. In 1970 alone, pension
fund purchases of common stock exceeded $4.6 billion.!7
Presently, 870,000 private pension plans hold assets of $2
trillion, or about $8,000 for every man, woman and child
in the United States.7 " Pension funds are an extremely im74
portant benefit to individual employees and their unions.
Unfortunately, the pension assets of organized labor
are often invested in enterprises that are philosophically antithetical to the goals of unions' 7 However, unions have
made only slight advancements in the realm of pension fund
management. In the late 1960's, the AFL-CIO, UAW, and
Ralph Nader, representing the Public Interest Research
Group, called for flexibility in the law to enable trustees to
invest in high social priority projects 7 6 The Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union's (ACTWU) corporate
campaign against J.P. Stevens and Company, embarked
upon after seventeen years of battle when the traditional
tactics of gaining recognition failed, successfully utilized
their influence over pension funds. The union was able to
achieve victory by manipulating pension fund assets owned
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by other unions to force J.P. Stevens to come to the bargaining table. 77
In 1980, the AFL-CIO released its first study of union
strategies for pension investment control. The AFLCIO
recommended using such strategies as capital investment
to influence recognition by subjecting the fundholders to
boycott campaigns. It also endorsed the use of share voting rights held by pension funds to pass union supported
resolutions at corporate shareholder meetings. Further, it
recommended that attempts be made to utilize pension assets to finance home mortgages or other loans for fund
members and for the creation of jobs. Control by the un79
ion over the trustees was deemed imperative.
Some unions have been able to secure the right to influence pension investing within the collective bargaining
agreement. 8" So far, however, unions have not played a
significant role in pension fund management. Their reluctance is primarily two-fold' 8 First, unions fear the legal and
economic implications of imprudent investments. A group
of beneficiaries can bring a class action derivative suit
against the union for breach of fiduciary duty. The result
could be a liability of millions of dollars to the union simply for making a pro-labor investment. The extent to which
unions can use pension funds to influence or control investment is further restricted by the legal framework established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA),' 82 the federal act governing private pension
funds. The legal framework is both comprehensive, in its
coverage of the activities of pension plan fiduciaries, and
complex, in its restrictions on the management or disposition of plan assets. ERISA is further complicated by the
lack of clear judicial and legislative interpretations of the
statute. Second, the unions have generally avoided involvement in the management of the economy.
Although both reasons for the unions' reluctance to
become involved in pension fund management are valid,
the first reason is more complex and flexible, and therefore more prone to interesting future opportunities. The development of law surrounding ERISA will either be a
promising path for the future of the labor movement or a
lost dream to the American population. This section will
deal solely with ERISA and the case law and political statements made concerning it.
The potential power unions could acquire can easily
be equated with the power now possessed by banks.8 "
When a bank purchases stock with the assets of a pension fund, it has the sole voting rights for that stock. Thus,
the bank has substantial influence and, in some cases, control of the company's policy. The bank is consulted on each
major decision of the company, thus allowing it to maintain a position of counselor in the economy. The bank can
use pension assets to extend credit or deny credit to companies throughout the country. A bank decides which companies, which philosophies, and which social goals will be
funded and able to thrive. As another condition of investment, a bank can insist that its chairman sit on the board
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of directors of the company to ensure the bank has a greater
say in company policy.
It is important to understand how far a union can go
in making socially beneficial investments, one of the major
goals of which is to create jobs and stimulate the economy in the community where the pension funds originate.
Pension funds could possibly be used as collateral for loans
needed to establish worker owned companies, purchase existing companies, and consequently, create jobs for union
84
members.1
Judicial interpretations of ERISA, and the approval of
investments under ERISA, have focused on three parts of
the Act. First, there is a duty of loyalty that trustees must
abide by: investments must be made solely in the interest
of beneficiaries and exclusively for the purpose of their
benefit' 85 Second, investments must be made according
to the prudent investment rule.' 86 Finally, certain transac8 7
tions are prohibited'
However, decisions are not always made methodically in accordance with these three categories. Some uncertainty as to how to proceed with investments stems from
the confusion in judicial decisions. In Brock v.Walton,'88 Local 675 of the Operating Engineers International Union used
its pension fund to purchase and develop ninety-five acres
of land in conjunction with a Florida Real Estate Project.
The fund also planned to finance the construction of several
buildings on the site. Union members were to be used as
the primary source of labor in land development and construction of the buildings. The fund also issued first mortgage loans on residential property. The District Court, in
ruling on the question of the creation of jobs, held that ERISA U404(a)(1)(A), "for the exclusive benefit" provision, does
not simply prohibit a party other than a plans participants
and beneficiaries from benefitting in some measure from
a prudent transaction.' 89 The Court of Appeals, on the other
hand, focused on the prudent investment rule, and allowed
the fund to issue first mortgage loans on residential property
although the loans were to carry interest at a rate lower
than the prevailing rates in the community. The court
based its decision on the critical fact that the trustees had
consulted with lawyers, accountants, actuaries and investment bankers over a six month period and therefore, did
not violate the prudent investors rule.' 90 In commenting on
prohibited transactions, the court distinguished this case
from other cases involving self-dealing or preferential loans
to plan officers where the trustees ran afoul of the rule prohibiting transactions with "parties in interests." 9'
Certain factions of organized labor have mistakenly
hailed the decision as setting a firm and favorable precedent for union pension investment' 92 However, since the
court did not decide the case under the duty of loyalty provision,' 93 the precedent set is neither as firm nor as favorable as believed,' 94 and leaves the most important question,
of what "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries, for the exclusive benefit of providing benefits
to the participants and their beneficiaries"' 95 means, un-

answered.
Under the exclusive benefit portion of this provision,
questioning has centered primarily on the meaning of financial benefits to employees. The financial community has
argued, and the Department of Labor has agreed, that this
phrase refers only to the economic gain to be achieved from
a certain investment. 96 The term is generally used throughout the Act in reference to those cash benefits that a participant or his family would receive in accordance with the
specifications of the plan. 97 Advocates of socially responsible investing contend that the declaration of policy
advanced' 98 does not refer to the objective of providing nonfinancial benefits to the employees through a socially
responsible investment policy. Instead, the declaration and
accompanying findings focus upon the need for fiduciary
standards which ensure the financial "soundness"and "stability" of the plan. 99 Thus, the union can argue that nonfinancial benefits are within the exclusive benefit rule; ifthe
participants are not working because jobs have shifted elsewhere, contributions to the fund will cease. If contributions
cease, the fund will not be able to meet its fundamental
responsibilities.
In fact, the preamble to the Labor Department regulations points out that investment in securities issued by a
small or new company, which may be riskier than those
of a "blue chip" company, may be entirely proper under the
Act.20 ' Furthermore, Congress has been considering the
limitations of the exclusive benefit rule and is realizing the
need to broaden the rule to allow consideration of broader
constituency
and longer term indirect benefits to the par20
ticipants. '

However, union officials may have difficulty proving,
for example, that a policy investing only in unionized companies is intended to benefit the participants as workers
rather than the union itself.2 2 Unions need to be leery of
the collateral benefit to the union violating the "solely in the
interest" portion of the duty of loyalty.
In Blankenship v. Boyle, 20 3 the District Court held that

manipulation of the United Mine Workers' pension fund to
coerce utility companies into purchasing coal supplies from
UMW was a breach of fiduciary duty. While acknowledging that workers do benefit from investment practices that
strengthen the union, 2 4 the court found a clear case of selfdealing, in effect deciding under the prohibited transactions
section of ERISA; the fact that the union had the funds
in a no interest account was considered significant.
In Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System of New
York,2"' defendant trustees invested in highly speculative
city bonds in hopes of averting the bankruptcy of New York
City. Plaintiffs brought a suit alleging breach of fiduciary
duties. The court held that the city's possible bankruptcy
was sufficient cause for the investment decision. This collateral benefit sufficiently satisfied the primary interests of
the participants. It must be noted that a possible flaw in
the argument utilizing this case to support socially responsible investing is that the pension fund was a public retireIN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

ment plan and therefore not covered by ERISA.
As a result of these decisions, a case by case analysis
has developed. In order for unions to proceed in gaining
control of pension funds, they must adhere to a few guidelines. 20 6 First, fiduciaries should analyze the needs and objectives of the participants and the plan and must determine
whether the financial characteristics of the investment will
satisfy the prudent investment requirements of the statute.
Financial advisors with an interest in long term investment
should be hired. A critical factor in defending an investment
is the development of a rationale for the investment decision at the time it is made. While a fiduciary may be able
to follow a socially sensitive investment policy by choosing to invest in worker owned companies and argue the
nonfinancial benefits to employees, a socially dictated investment policy, in which financial comparability is
sacrificed in order to achieve some social purpose will probably not withstand scrutiny under the prudent investor
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rule.
Second, assessments of investments have included a
review of the fiduciary's conduct at the time the decision
was made. Approval of investments has been granted when
the plan's investors have been able to produce a complete
analysis showing how the investments successfully further
the plan's investment objectives. Empirical support is mandatory. If there is any element of self-interest in the choice
of investments, whether that interest is financial or ideological, the statute may prohibit such conduct. It is essential that investment programs be designed primarily to
further the interests of participants and beneficiaries. In
designing a plan that permits only investments which aid
the interests of the plan participants as participants and
that simultaneously attempts to support worker ownership,
the final result might be investment in that particular company, thus raising the common criticism of placing the investment at the mercy of a single enterprise. The collateral
benefit doctrine is a seemingly uncompromising one
However, efforts should be made to circumvent it by arguing that employees do benefit by the creation of jobs, the
reinvestment of funds within the communities, and the
strengthening of their union. Thus, they remain the primary
interest benefitting from the investment.
The possible benefits of controlling pension fund investment far outweigh the possible legal challenges. Unions should pursue the management of pension funds to
promote the needs of their members. Worker ownership
can be legitimately advanced as a socially responsible investment and such investment is legal within the framework of ERISA.

SPRING 1990

VII. CONCLUSION
The current problems in the economy warrant the labor
movement's reassessment of strategies it uses to encounter new challenges. Although in the past unionists have
wrestled with a variety of strategies, none have so far been
more than moderately successful. Employee ownership is
a viable strategy unions can pursue as a way to gain control over capital and anchor capital within communities.
Realizing the power worker ownership has to support local communities by creating, retaining and improving jobs,
organized labor should include worker ownership as a tactic in the general struggle for economic reform.
In order for worker owned companies to survive as
profitable businesses and worker ownership to be an effective tool in revitalizing the economy, unions will have to
develop new skills to intimately assist workers in the development of worker owned businesses. Through development of worker ownership, unions are in a pivotal position
to assist in economic development.
These attempts at worker ownership, although quite
successful at times, need to be developed, improved and
strengthened. The labor movement should take advantage
of the growing private and public support for worker ownership and try to influence and develop this so it can meet
organized labor's needs. Union policies regarding employee
ownership need to reflect a commitment to worker ownership and guide future projects. Clearly, unions can assist
workers in becoming owners and, at the same time, create
new and vital roles for themselves. The necessity for substantial union involvement during negotiations and for a
continued strong union presence once employee ownership
is established is imperative to ensure workers' rights and
benefits during and after negotiations. Most importantly,
unions can expedite the democratization of corporate
institutions.
Finally, the numerous legal questions raised by the involvement of unions in employee ownership should not discourage employee ownership and control in a situation
which makes financial sense for both business and employees. The AFLCIO should mount a nationwide campaign for worker control of pension funds through less
stringent requirements on union investment. With proper
legal precautions, these obstacles should not prevent labor
organizations from forging the way to economic redevelopment and revitalization.
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and with significant help from the state of Michigan, the mine reopened
as a 70 percent ESOP-owned company. Rosen, supranote 2, at 21-22,
35; Ball, United Steelworkers ... Initiatives, The Entrepreneurial Economy, Nov. 1987, at 11-14. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
* Independent Steel Union fostered the purchase of Weirton Steel
from National Steel through the establishment of a nondemocratic ESOP
and the creation of shop floor participation. Since the buy-out, Weirton
has done very well. In fact, it has been the most profitable integrated steel.
maker in the U.S., clearly showing that an employee owned company can
prosper in this industry. Lynd, Why We Opposed the Buy-out at Weirton
Steel, 6 Lab.Res.Rev. 41 (Spring 1985); Anderson, An Employee Stock
Ownership Plan: The History of the Weirton Steel Buy-Out, 26
Duq.L.Rev. 657 (Spring 1988); Rosen, supra note 2, at 20.
13. A cooperative is a company that is wholly owned by the people
who work in it. For a further explanation worker cooperatives see Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation,XI N.Y.U. Rev.L. & Soc.
Change 441 (1982-3). The following are examples of Worker Cooperatives unions have been involved in:
0 UFCW was able to persuade A&P to grant the workers a right
to first refusal on the Philadelphia division stores and endorse a capital
loan fund for these buy-outs. As a result, five Owned & Operated (O&O)
Supermarkets have been opened. Kreiner, Worker Ownership as the Basis for an Integrated, ProactiveDevelopment Model, XV N.Y.U. Rev. L.
& Soc. Change 227 (1986-87); Eggerton, Workers Take Over the Store,
The NY Times Magazine, Sept. 11, 1983.
N Bricklayers and Allied Crafts Union Local #1 of Birmingham,
Alabama with the financial and technical assistance of their International Union brought forth a new cooperative corporation, Jefferson Masonry, Inc. The union has decided to discontinue the Birmingham project at
least for the time being. Mackin, Jefferson Masonry, Inc., The Entrepreneurial Economy, Nov. 1987 at, 13-14; letter received from C. Mackin, Nov.
12, 1989.
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N Independent Drivers Association initiated the worker takeover of
an ongoing and profitable firm. In 1979, Denver Yellow Cab Cooperative
Association was opened as a worker cooperative and is currently the fourth
largest taxi company. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 152-161; 166-176.
14. For a discussion of creative collective bargaining see Compa, Baicich, Barber, & Banks, The JAM District 100 Model - A Debate, 5
Lab.Res.Rev. 81 (Summer 1984) [hereinafter LAMDebate] (discussing
the International Association of Machinists District 100's collective bargaining agreement with Eastern Airlines, saving Eastern from bankruptcy in 1984).
E The International Association of Machinists District 100 was able
to rescue Eastern Airlines from bankruptcy. In exchange for 18 percent
wage cuts, employees received 12.5 million common shares - about 25
percent of outstanding stock - and 3 million dividend paying preferred
shares set at the value of the concessions. District 100 won the right to
vet, on a one-time basis only, both Easterrs 1984 business plan and
the financial restructuring program made possible by the union's wage concessions. On a continuing basis, the union also won the following management rights:
E the right to review the company's business plans, major capital
expenditures and expansions and 'to participate in the company's decisionmaking process" in these areas;
0 the right to appeal any company plan or decision directly to the
board of directors;
" unlimited access to all company financial information;
" a right to participate in the design of new facilities and in the redesign of existing facilities;
" four seats on the board of directors; and,
" a requirement that the company disclose a full list of all the consultants it hires. Id. at 84; see Rosen, supra note 2, at 25.
N The UAW was able to secure a seat on Chrysler's board of directors, to be occupied by Douglas Fraser, UAW president in exchange for
$203 million worth of concessions. See infra notes 125,126,134,147 and
162 and accompanying text.
15. Attempts by the Airline Pilots Association to purchase United
Airlines or its corporate parent, UAL Corporation, during 1987, 1988 and
1989 represent union involvement in employee takeovers. See Hyde &
Livingston, supra note 6, at 1154-1162; Rosen, supra note 2, at 27-28;
Wall Street Journal, series of articles beginning in September, 1989 through
December, 1989.
16. 'The transference of economic ownership to workers ... is by
itself irrelevant, and is at best a means to an end. That end is not ownership, but control: the extension of democracy to the production process
and the elimination of artificial inequality' Kaufman, supra note 7, at 825
citing J. Rifkin & R. Barber, The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics & Power in the 1980's 83 (1978).
17. J. Grossman, William Sylvis: Pioneer of American
Labor; A Study of the Labor Movement During the Era of the
Civil War 189 (1945).
18. Id. at 190 (The molders had spent a million and a half dollars
on strikes with no permanent gain during the years 1859-1869).
19. However, William Sylvis was not at the forefront of the cooperative movement. Cooperatives had existed for several years prior to his
advocation: the Philadelphia House Carpenters of 1791; the cordwainers
of 1806; and, the Rochdale Society's cooperative system, started in 1844
are a few of the earlier attempts. Id. at 193-199.
20. J. Grossman, supra note 17, at 200.
21. Id. at 204-206.
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id. at 208-9.
24. G. Grob, Workers and Utopia; A Study of Ideological Conflict in the American Labor Movement 37 (1961).
25. Id. at 37.
26. L.Heckscher, Democracy at Work. In Whose Interest,
188-199 (Jan. 1981). The Politics of Worker Participation. (Thesis, available from Dept. of Sociology, Harvard University).
27. Id. at 118.
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28. NLRA §§ 1-19; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982) (declaring as the policy
of the United States:
[the] eliminat[ion] [of] the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection).
29. NLRA §8(a)(5); 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (making it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "refuseto bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(ar) and
§8(b)(3); 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(3) (making it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization 'to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of
section 9(a)").
30. NLRA §9(a); 29 U.S.C. §159(a).
31. 452 U.S. 666, 669 (1981) (holding that an employer does not
have a duty to bargain in good faith over its decision to close a part of
its business).
32. R. Stem & R. O'Brien, National Unions and Employee Ownership (May 1977) (unpublished manuscript available from Cornell University) (summarizing the content of letters received from research directors
and officers of forty-nine national unions in response to an inquiry on their
policies toward worker ownership of firms).
33. Id. at 6; see Slott, supra note 8, at 93 ('fW]orker ownership
divert[s] workers' activity into projects which will either fail economically
or be coopted by the system, they don't strength labor. Worse, they can
be an additional source of disunity for working class already hampered
by sexual, racial and occupational divisions")34. P. Pitegoff, Unions and Worker Ownership 2 Policy Studies
Journal (forthcoming publication).
35. See Ronan, supra note 12.
36. The Employee Cooperative Corporations Act, MASS. GEN
LAWS ANN. ch. 157A (West 1982). See Ellerman & Pitegoff, supra note
13.
37. Employee Ownership Assistance Act, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48
§§ 1303-1313 (Smith-Hurd 1984-1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.751 (West 1984); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1801(11)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1983); Delaware Employee Ownership Act, DEL CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 6508 (1981); Employee Ownership Assistance Act of 1982, 1982
Cal. Legis. Serv. 8244 (West); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 Art. 41 § 14J
(Repl. Vol. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 40 (Michie/Law, Coop. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-L2 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27 H-90 (West 1984-85 Supp.); See, eg. Duquet, supra note 3; Moberly, New Directionsin Worker Participationand Collective Bargaining,87
W.Va.L.Rev. 765 (Summ. 1985).
38. See supra notes 12-14 for examples.
39. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 2.
40. Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership, 5 Wis.L.Rev.
731, 759 (1982).
41. W. Whyte, supra note 1, at 96.
42. Redmon, supra note 12, at 5.
43. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 82.
44. Id. at 81.
45. Id. at 87 (stating that the deferred 1975 payments were not met
in 1978. The union agreed to postpone one more year. Payments on the
1978 and 1979 pension obligations, however, were never made either).
46. Redmon, supra note 12, at 5-6.
47. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 88.
48. See id. at 89 (for the specifics of the consultant's recommendations.).
49. Id. at 89-90.
50. Rosen, Kline, & Young, How Employee OwnershipPlans Work
in Employee Ownership in America: The Equity Solution
(1986) [hereinafter EO in America].
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I
51. Redmon, supra note 12, at 10.
52. C. Gunn, supranote 12, at 94; W. Whyte, supranote 1, at 97.
53. W. Whyte, supranote 1, at 98-99 (Since there was no candidate at the time, existing management continued until the election of Herbert Einstein in 1981).
54. Id. at 100.
55. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 94. Although the specifics of the
Local's Agreement and its incorporation of the Master Agreement are interesting, the import is the protection of industry-wide standards. A common criticism of employee buy-outs is that they have occurred as part
of a concession deal. Concession bargaining undermines union standards
and hurts other workers in the rest of the labor movement See Slott, supra
note 8, at 87.
56. Basically this trust would have avoided many of the ESOP regulations and would have held in trust employees' stock given in exchange
for their wage deductions. See Olson, supra note 40, at 756, n.137 (detailing
the specifics of the proposed trust plan).
57. ERISA §406(3); 29 U.S.C. §1106(e) (prohibits transactions between plan and party in interest if... (e) acquisition on behalf of the plan,
or any employer security or real property is in violation of §1107(a) of
this section.). ERISA §407(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. §1107(a)(2) ('A plan may not
acquire any qualifying employer security or qualifying employer real property,
if immediately after such acquisition the aggregate fair market value of
the plan exceeds 10 percent of the fair market value of the assets of the
plan.")
58. Olson, supra note 40, at 755-756.
59. Redmon, supra note 12, at 7.
60. ESOP structure is established in accordance with legislative restrictions in a written agreement negotiated between the selling management, union or nonunion representatives and financiers. See ERISA
§§407-08; 29 U.S.C. §§1107-08 (1987). Furthermore, ESOPs are exempted
from ERISA §406; 29 U.S.C. §1106 prohibited transactions. ERISA
§408(b); 29 U.S.C. §1108(b).
61. Redmon, supra note 12, at 6.
62. The written plan validating the ESOP must provide for the establishment of an Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT). The ESOT
is formed to hold all the assets of the ESOP.
63. Redmon, supra note 12, at 8.
64. The ESOP plan details which employees participate in the ESOP,
thus which employees can vote ERISA §102(b); 29 U.S.C. §1022(b). Oson, supranote 40, at 757 (Raths ESOP agreement specified that all bargaining unit employees are to participate in the ESOP and nonbargaining
unit employees may participate).
65. See Democratic ESOP, supra note 12.
66. Since shares of stock can be issued in accordance with levels
of wages, managerial employees tend to have a greater number of shares.
Thus, it is important to have a one vote per person basis rather than a
one vote per share basis.
67. Olson, supra note 40, at 758 (citing Rath Packing Company Employee Stock Ownership Plan Prospectus (Dec. 10, 1982) at App. B-3).
68. Id. at 758.
69. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 829 (ERISA and I.R.C. Regulations required that every employee benefits plan be established and maintained through a written instrument which provides 'for one or more named
fiduciaries who ... shall have authority to control and maintain the operation and administration of the plan.")
70. EO in America, supra note 50, at 105-106.
71. Id. at 104.
72. Olson, supra note 40, at 104.
73. EO in America, supra note 50, at 104.
74. Id. at 104.
75. Olson, supra note 40, at 760. But see Redmon, supra note 2,
at 6 (Late in 1982 Rath found itself $38 million behind in its payments
to its employees' pension funds, and Rath management took extreme action: the pension plans were terminated, affecting over 6,000 people)
76. Redmon, supra note 12, at 11-12 (In 1979, deferrals amounted
to $4,000 per person. These deferrals were continued from 1979 to 1983).
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77. Redmon, supra note 12, at 20.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Redmon, supra note 12, at 7, 14.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. at 17.
82. Rosen, supra note 2, at 11.
83. Id. at 60-61.
84. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 12.
85. Swinney, supra note 8, at 104.
86. Id. at 104.
87. Pitegoff and Lynd, Workers Can Be Choosers, New York Times,
October 27, 1982.
88. See Swinney, supra note 8, at 104 ('Worker ownership Is not
a good tactic when: proposed by a company as an effort to get the workers to finance the closing of a plant which has been milked dry and would
have no viable future under any owner; proposed by a company as an
effort to liquidate or neutralize the union; the company is not capable of
surviving in the marketplace; and, the workers are not capable of running
the plantf.)
89. GuidelinesHelp Unions Assess ESOPs, AFLCIO News, August
22, 1987.
90. ERISA §404(A); 29 U.S.C. §1104(A).
91. Rosen, supra note 2, at 42 (stating that according to a 1985
ESOP Association survey of its membership (236 companies responded), only 7 percent had converted a pension plan into an ESOP and 34
percent had a pension plan in addition to their ESOP).
92. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 3 (noting several consequential uses
that have arisen, which may incidentally hurt employees. Revelant among
those noted are: replacing pension plans or other employee benefit programs, so as to retain cash that otherwise would be permanently Invested in the other programs and recouping cash in an existing benefit plan
by converting it to an ESOP which uses its assets to buy stock from the
company).
93. Guidelines Help UnionsAssess ESOPs, supranote 89; see Ball,
supra note 12, at 11 (The United Steelworkers of America, one of the
few unions with an active program of support for employee-ownership
initiatives, strongly states in its resolution on ESOPs that:
ESOPs must never be used as a substitute for an adequate,
properly funded pension plan guaranteed by the Federal Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The basic retirement Incomes
of our members must not depend on the solvency of any single
business enterprise in a free market economy. (Emphasis added).)
94. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 6.
95. Hoerr, ESOPs:Revolution orRipoff?, Bus. Week, April 15,1985
at 95.
96. G. Hansen & F. Adams, ESOPs, Unions and The Rank
and File 9 (1989) (available from the Industrial Cooperative Association).
97. Farrell, Hoerr, Employee Ownership: Is It Goodfor You? Or Your
Company?, Business Week, May 15, 1989 at 119.
98. DemocraticESOP supranote 12, at 7 (The 1986 Tax Reform
Act provides express authorization for this model). See I.R.C. §409(e)(5);
26 U.S.C. §408(e)(5)(1987).
99. Democratic ESOR supra note 12, at 6-8 (discussing the two
democratic voting structures that can be devised within an ESOP).
100. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 841-842.
101. Id. at 842.
102. See ICA Report on Worker Education Efforts (1984) (for descriptions of some worker education efforts by C. Turner and a call for a new
pedagogy for democratic labor-based education by F. Adams).
103. Putterman, Some BehavioralPerspectives on the Dominance
of HierarchicalOver DemocraticForms of Enterprise,3 J. of Econ. Behay. & Organization 140 (1982).
104. Philadelphia Assoc. Cooperative Enterprises, Union Role In Employee Ownership (memo on file with author) (hereinafter PACE),
105. See infra text accompanying notes 110116 (discussing unions'
role as an institutionalized legitimate opposition).
106. See P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 9 (indicating that many worker owned companies supplement the ownership structure with other
mechanisms for employee participation and influence in order to estab.
lish a more democratic company).
107. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 842 (citing J. Simmons & W.
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Mares, Working Together 256 (1983)).
108. Hansen & Adams, supra note 96, at 10.
109. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Ca, 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
110. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 842; Ellerman, The Legitimate Opposition at Work: The Union's Role in LargeDemocraticFirms, ICA (April
1986).

111. Hansen & Adams, supra note 96, at 9.
112. PACE, supra note 104 citing Sklar, An Experiment in Worker
Ownership, Dissent 61-69 (Winter 1982) quoting Chuck Mueller, from
UFCW Local 46 at Rath Packing Company:
My picture of the union in all of this is to watch out for the
individual. Because there's always one guy that's got a grievance
that everybody else couldn't care less about. So he's gotta have
some protection; and the union is the only thing I see will do
it ... A personnel director could do it, but I haven't seen many
[i]f [sic] em who will. They won't buck the corporation for one guy.
113. PACE, supra note 104.
114. See Smith, The LaborMovement and Worker Ownership,2 Social Report (Boston College) (Smith, as assistant to the President of the
United Steelworkers of America sets forth six fairly conventional functions for unions in worker owned enterprises, the following two are the
most relevant to this paper 3) negotiating and enforcing equitable arrangements for promotion, demotion, layoff, recall, prevention of unfair discipline,
the structure of wage relationships, and other working conditions problems
and 5) establishing and enforcing safe and healthful working conditions,
and informing workers on workplace hazards).
115. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 158-160.
116. See E. Greenberg, Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of Participation 84-88 (1986) (noting the serious lack
of workplace safety in the Plywood Cooperatives, a nonunionized worker cooperative).
117. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 74 (Positing eleven fundamentals
that are essential to worker ownership. I have chosen the following fundamentals which must be recognized and committed to in order for unions' to elevate their role in promoting worker ownership as a method of
economic reform which serves the interests of workers:
1) Control and management of the enterprise is the right
of all people who work at it, and this right is based on their work
role, not on any stipulation of capital ownership. Management
is based on direct and/or representative democracy and equality
of voting power among all who work in the enterprise
2) Income earned by the enterprise after payment of all costs
and taxes, belongs to those who work for it.
7) A participatoryidemocratic consciousness within the enterprise is essential, and educational emphasis on the philosophy
and practice of workers' self-management should reinforce this
set of attitudes and values.
8) All information must be available to all enterprise members, and managerial expertise must be shared and disseminated as fully as possible.
9) The enterprise must assure individual rights corresponding
to basic political liberties to members within the firm.
10) An internal but independent judiciary must be capable
of action to settle disputes over infractions of rules, enforce basic rights, and protect the by-laws of the enterprise).
118. Ellerman, supra note 110, at 7.
119. Id. at 15.
120. But see Klare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness,62 Minn.L.Rev. 265 (1975)
(discussing the rejection of the collective bargaining model altogether as
a barrier which keeps the workforce from marshalling its full strength to
establish worker-controlled industries).
121. See supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text (arguing the
necessity of a formalized and legitimized opposition in worker owned companies; the unions' traditional role naturally able to fulfill this requirement).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31; United Technologies v. NLRB, 115 LLR.M. (BNA) 1281, 1283 (further limiting mandatory subjects of bargaining).
123. Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Union Representation on CorporateBoard of Directors, 130 U.Pa.L.Rev. 919, 930 (April
1982) [hereinafter Economic and Legal].
124. Id. at 925.
125. UAW president Douglas Fraser made it very clear prior to his
election to the Chrysler board that he would represent worker interests.
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See Hayes, FraserBoardRoles Riles Critics,Raises Questions,N.Y. -imes,
Nov. 26, 1979, at D1, col. 1.
126. New York Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at Al, col. 4 (in return for the
board seat, the UAW agreed to $203 million worth of concessions to Chrysler in the collective bargaining agreement that it had negotiated with the
three major domestic automakers.). In further support, six airlines have
worker representatives on their boards as a result of the collective bargaining process. See e.g. Olson, supra note 40, at 778 (discussing Pan
Am); IAM Debate, supra note 14 (discussing Eastem Airlines).
127. The basis of the following discussion on fiduciary duty is attributed to Economic and Legal, supra note 123.
128. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("It is
clear that a director owes loyalty and allegiance to the company-a loyalty
that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced ...by no consideration other than the welfare of the corporation.)
129. The Supreme Court of Michigan accentuated this view in Dodge
v. Ford Motor Company, 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919) (stating that 'it is
not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefits others ... ")See Hamer,
Sewing Two Masters: Union Representationon CorporateBoard of Directors, 81 CoLLRev. 639 (1981).
130. See Hamer, supra note 129.
131. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
132. 6 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations 276 (1950 rev.
vol.) citing People ex rel Metra Life Ins. Ca v. Hutchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649
(App. Div. 1909) (upholding the decision to erect a hospital for its consumptive employees). See also Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S.
718 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (allowing the corporation, following plant relocation,
to construct new phones and contribute to church, school and free baths
for their employees).
133. Hamer, supra note 129. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Ca v. Barlow, 98
A.2d 581, 590 (1953) (sustaining the validity of the donation by the corporation to a university, stating explicitly that Individual shareholders whose
private interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the plaintiff corporation, ought not be permitted to close their eyes to present day realities
and thwart the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a constituent of our modem social structure); Herald Co. v. Seawall, 472 F2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972)
(sustaining the establishment of an employee stock ownership plan, finding the motivation of benefitting the public, the corporation and the employees as valid).
134. In 1979 Chrysler asked the President of the UAW, Douglas
Fraser to sit on the Board. Moreover, Chrysler reserved the right to choose
the Directors that would represent the union and employees.
135. Labor-Management Report and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
Section 501(a), 29 U.S.C. section 501(a) (1976). The pertinent text of this
provision is as follows:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation
to such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore,
the duty of each such person, taking into account the special
problems and functions of a labor organization ...to refrain from
dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf
of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and
from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which
conflicts with the interests of such organization ...
136. Hamer, supra note 129, at 645-47.
137. Hamer, supra note 129, at 649-50.
138. Economic and Legal, supra note 123.
139. L. Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company
Law 578 (4th ed. 1979).
140. One of the objectives of the NLRA was to combat the company union. According to Senator Wagner, who authored the Act, 'The
greatest obstacles to collective bargaining are employer dominated unions ... [T]he very first step toward genuine collective bargaining is the
abolition of the employer dominated union as an agency for dealing with
the grievances, labor disputes, wages, rules, or hours of employment" 78
Congressional Record, p. 3443.
141. NLRA § 8(a)(2) (Making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to if.) and
§ 8(b)(1)(B) (making it an unfair labor practice for a union to interfere with
the employer's right to select its representative for collective bargaining
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or adjustment of grievances).
142. Ferguson & Gaal, Codeterrnination:A Fador A Future in America?, 10 Employee Rel.L.J. 176, 190 (Aut. 1984).
143. Id. at 190.
144. NLRA §8(a)(2). See eg. Moberly, supra note 37, at 766 (stating that the NLRB did not find Fraser's position on the Chrysler Board
an unlawful conflict of interest or employer domination).
145. The line of cases finding employer domination have arisen
primarily at health care institutions connected to, or serving, a substantial number of patients under health and welfare plans. Olson, supra note
40, at 791, n.335 (St. Louis Labor Health Institute, 230 N.LR.B. 180
(1977); Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 225 N.LRB. 575 (1976);
Medical Foundation of Bellaire, 193 N.LR.B. 62 (1971); United Mineworkers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund, 192 N.LR.B. 1022 (1977);
Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181 N.LR.B. 135 (1970)).
146. Rosen, supranote 2, at 65-66. But see infratext accompanying notes 167-168 (Bausch & Lomb, 108 N.LR.B. 1555 (1954) (finding
mere potential of abuse sufficient)).
147. Douglas Fraser, UAW president and Chrysler director, indicated shortly before his election to the Chrysler board that 'he would stay
out of all board actions dealing directly with collective bargaining strategy but would take full part in discussion and votes on everything else,
including basic policies on collective bargaining .. " Raskin, The Labor
Leader as Company Director,New York Times, April 27, 1980, at F15,
col. 1; Moberly, supra note 37, at 766 (indicating that Fraser, in order to
resolve potential conflict questions also refrained from discussion of a 1982
UAW strike against Chrysler that began in Canada).
148. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RR, 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (a case
arising under the Railway Labor Act). It was not until 1962 that the NLRB
held that the unions duty rooted by the Supreme Court in the exclusiverepresentative provision of Section #9(a) of the NLRA, could be enforced
by the Board through the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA
in Miranda Fuel Ca, 140 N.LR.B. 181 (1962), enf't denied, 326 F2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963).
149. Mishkind and Khorey, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Fables and Facts, 11 Employee Rel.L.J. 89, 99-100 (1985).
150. 640 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1981).
151. 656 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981).
152. Rosen, supra note 2, at 66.
153. Id. at 66.
154. See eg. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Ca, 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Caster
Mold & Machine Ca, 148 N.LR.B. 1614 (1964) (unless an employer claims
an inability to pay, there is no duty to divulge financial information). This,
however, would not be a problem if the parties have agreed to share information.
155. Economic and Legal, supra note 123, at 930.
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
157. Murtach v. Texas Air Corp., 118 FR.D. 450 (1989).
158. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1976).
159. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12; 18 U.S.C. §§ 402,660,2385,3691;
29 U.S.C. §§ 53, 55 (1976).
160. Clayton Act 88, 15 U.S.C. §19 (1976).
161. Olson, supra note 40, at 8034 citing Steuer, Employee Representation on the Board: IndustrialDemocracy or Interlocking Directorate?,
16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 255, 277-79 (1977) (Indirect interlocks
are situations in which two competing corporations that have no director
in common each have a representative who sits on the board of their company. Indirect interlocks can also exist when a non-competing organization has different representatives on the boards of each of two or more
competing companies. Such an organization could ... be a labor union,
if unions succeed in gaining representation on the boards of American
corporations. Indirect interlocks can be created not only by persons who
hold multiple directorships but also by persons who hold only one directorship and are officers or members, rather than directors, or another organization).
162. Moberly, supra note 37, at 766 (The Federal Trade Commission sustained Douglas Fraser's position on the Chrysler Board of Directors under antitrust law). But see Letter, Sanford M. Litvack, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US. Dept. of Labor, CCH Trade Reg.
Rptr. Current Comment paragraph 50, 425 (responding to UAWs inquiry
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